

Workshop on Laboratory Experimental Sociology
Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna
17-18 June 2016

17 June

13:15-13:30	Coffee
13:30-14:15	Klarita Gërxhani (EUI, Fiesole) Another Gender Bias? Individual Credit Attribution to Mixed Gender Collaboration
14:15-15:00	Roman Hoffmann (Uni Wien) The Emergence of Reputation: The Role of Direct and Indirect Costs of Information Sharing
15:00-15:15	Coffee
15:15-16:00	Vincent Buskens (Uni Utrecht) Partner-specific Behavior in Social Networks: Coordination among Actors with Heterogeneous Preferences
16:00-16:45	Sabine Neuhofer (Uni Wien) Offers Beyond the Negotiating Dyad
16:45-17:00	Coffee
17:00-17:45	Thomas Gautschi (Uni Mannheim) Bargaining and Exchange in Social Networks: Negotiation Outcomes and Structural Dynamics
17:45-18:30	Manuel Schwaninger (Uni Wien) Needs-Based Justice in Social Exchange Networks
19:30	Heurigen

18 June

9:15-9:30	Coffee
9:30-10:15	Heiko Rauhut (Uni Zürich) Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment
10:15-11:00	Georg Kanitsar (Uni Wien) Norms of Solidarity – An Experimental Study
11:00-11:15	Coffee
11:15-12:00	Ilona Reindl (Uni Wien) Let the Others Do the Job: Comparing Public Good Contribution Behavior in the Lab and in the Field
12:30	Lunch

Klarita Gërxhani

Another Gender Bias? Individual Credit Attribution to Mixed Gender Collaboration

We test experimentally a recent observational finding that female academics are penalized for co-authorship in a way that men are not (Sarsons, 2015). Our central research question is whether contributions by men and women to joint production are evaluated differently. Based on a cognitive task that varies – more female oriented vs. more male oriented – individual and joint (two-person) performance is measured. The joint outcome of a pair is evaluated by a third party and used to hire one of the two individuals concerned to do the same job again, but individually. In this way, the third party needs to attribute credit to each individual in the pair, based only on their joint output. This allows us to investigate whether this credit attribution varies according to whether the individual concerned is male or female. Our design allows us to distinguish between statistical discrimination and taste discrimination.

Roman Hoffmann, Bernhard Kittel & Mattias Larsen

The Emergence of Reputation: The Role of Direct and Indirect Costs of Information Sharing

Public reputation mechanisms have been shown to be an effective mean to limit opportunistic behavior in market interactions, for example on online or supplier markets. On these markets, information about an actor's past conduct can serve as important signal for potential interaction partners and as a disciplining device imposing the threat of excluding defectors from future interactions. While previous research was mostly concerned with settings, in which reputation mechanisms were exogenously introduced, we consider the endogenous emergence of reputation through information sharing among actors. We study a repeated investment game (comparable to sequential experience good markets) in which trustors can send an amount to a randomly matched trustee who can either reward the given trust or defect. After each round, trustors are allowed to share information about trustees' behavior with each other. In our experiment, we analyze the effect of direct and indirect costs on the willingness to share information with fellow trustors. Direct costs arise immediately from the sharing of information and are exogenously varied each round. Indirect costs are induced in one treatment by making trustors compete with each other in a tournament. Here, the sharing of private information may strengthen the position of the competitor and hence reduce the payoffs of the communicating actor. We find both direct and indirect costs to have a strong influence on trustor's willingness to share information with each other. Trustees seem to react to the changes by adjusting their beliefs and behaviors accordingly. Compared to a baseline treatment without public reputation mechanism, trustors' possibility to share information makes trustees significantly more trustworthy. However, if trustors compete with each other or if direct costs of information sharing are high, trustees resend considerably smaller amounts. This in turn negatively affects trustors' willingness to send large amounts and hence the overall efficiency of the market.

Vincent Buskens & Nikki van Gerwen

Partner-specific Behavior in Social Networks: Coordination among Actors with Heterogeneous Preferences

Conventions guide and structure our daily behavior. This study investigates experimentally decisions on conventions in networks. We focus on coordination games in which individuals can have conflicting interests. In contrast with many previous studies, we allow individuals to behave differently in interactions with different partners in the network. We investigate how partner-specific behavior influences coordination in networks when individuals have different preferences about conventions. Results show that being able to behave partner-specifically is sometimes disadvantageous for coordination and sometimes advantageous, depending on the heterogeneity in

preferences in the network. Moreover, subjects seem unable to foresee when the ability to behave partner-specifically is disadvantageous for coordination, since they invest in the ability to behave partner-specifically even when this does not pay off.

Bernhard Kittel, Sabine Neuhofer & Manuel Schwaninger
Offers Beyond the Negotiating Dyad

Distribution outcomes in sociological network models and experiments are restricted to negotiating dyads by design such that no payments to other network members are possible. Hence, the full range of other-regarding preferences cannot be analyzed in the traditional framework. We, therefore, design a three-player network distribution game and analyze bilaterally negotiated distributions in a balanced and an unbalanced power condition. In contrast to previous experiments, distributive offers can allocate shares of the fixed resource to network members who do not receive the offer. We expect the distribution to vary with the social value orientations of players on different network positions.

Thomas Gautschi
Bargaining and Exchange in Social Networks: Negotiation Outcomes and Structural Dynamics

For about two decades, exchange theories explain exchange outcomes as the result of bilateral bargaining on the distribution of a perfectly divisible surplus (e.g., cake, dollar). Sociological exchange theories have some common features. The theories explain how the structural positions in the bargaining network affect the exchange patterns between adjacent actors and their bilateral splits of cakes of given sizes. Power inequalities due to different structural positions manifest themselves in the negotiated distributions of exchange profits and, at least partly, in the actual trading patterns between connected actors. The focus on the structure only, however, is rather unsatisfactory, either from a theoretical point of view but also if the focus is on the understanding and explanation of real negotiation outcomes (e.g., wage bargaining, division of gains from joint-ventures). To explain and predict profit shares in exchange networks, many models have been proposed. Despite their differences, existing sociological exchange theories have common features: they almost exclusively deal with substitutable relations in which only one exchange per round of negotiations on surpluses of identical size is allowed. We identify properties a sufficiently general theory of exchange networks should have and propose a more flexible model which is not limited to a particular class of exchange networks but allows for point predictions in networks with complex characteristics. We thus model the effect of structural, normative, and situational factors on exchange outcomes.

Bernhard Kittel, Sabine Neuhofer & Manuel Schwaninger
Needs-Based Justice in Social Exchange Networks

Needs which are recognized as such might induce people to allocate more to society members who need more resources than others, leading to a needs-based distribution. In an experimental study we examine whether the introduction of heterogeneous needs affects the distribution of outcomes in small negative exchange networks. We operationalize an individual need as a threshold of points an actor has to obtain through the negotiated distribution in order to earn additional points in a subsequent real effort task. In contrast to previous exchange network experiments, an offer can allocate the given points to all network members and is not restricted to the negotiating dyad. Our results show that a majority of accepted offers fulfill the needs of all actors in the network which implies that common exchange models cannot predict the results. Moreover, the network structure, the collocation of needs, as well as the interaction of those, significantly affect the distribution of resources in the network.

Heiko Rauhut & Fabian Winter

Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment

While the current literature focuses on how social norms generate cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a new typology of normative conflict by combining Coleman's (1990) distinction between conjoint and disjoint norms with our own classification of commitment-related and content-related normative conflicts (Winter et al. 2012). We outline a theory of how the four resulting types of normative conflict can be ordered. We provide real-life examples and typical game-theoretical conceptualizations of the four cases and show how they can be sorted according to their conflict potential and the extent with which conflict can be restored by punishment. Then we discuss for each of the types a prototypical laboratory study and demonstrate how our theory can be applied and confirmed. We conclude with a discussion of how previously anomalous empirical results can be re-thought and understood in light of our theory. Finally, we give suggestions for prospective empirical micro-level corroborations and suggestions for mechanism design.

Georg Kanitsar

Norms of Solidarity – An Experimental Study

The project sheds light on the institutional conditions under which norms of solidarity evolve. Solidarity can be claimed to be one of the most popular concepts in the social sciences. Despite its significance, various, unconnected perspectives on solidarity coexist, such that ambiguity about its causes and the underlying mechanisms is still prevalent. The analytical foundation of the project identifies two perspectives, linked with the disciplines of sociology and economics. While the sociological conception is based on the social exchange literature and can best be interpreted as cohesion, the economic understanding is driven by the experimental solidarity game and regards solidarity from a behavioral point of view. The effect of institutional conditions on norms of solidarity is tested in an experimental setting in which participants engage in an indirect exchange of tokens in groups of 6. Through recurrent interaction norms evolve in the exchange groups. Across treatments the conditions of exchange are varied according to the institutional enforcements. Theoretically, institutions lead to higher levels of solidarity, if they set incentives to support high levels of cooperative exchange and if they allow for the ascription of a symbolic value towards the social unit. A subsequent dictator game tests whether the evolving norms indeed imply a higher willingness for solidarity behavior.

Ilona Reindl, Roman Hoffmann & Bernhard Kittel

Let the Others Do the Job: Comparing Public Good Contribution Behavior in the Lab and in the Field

Under the assumption of payoff-maximization, standard game theory predicts that groups playing a public good game (PGG) do not manage to coordinate on the social optimum of full cooperation and play the pareto-inferior Nash-equilibrium of zero contributions instead. Contrary to this, numerous lab experimental studies have shown that subjects contribute on average positive amounts to the public good. Students working on a group assignment which is graded on the group level are essentially playing a public good game. While investing a maximum amount of time and effort is the group optimal strategy, free-riding on the efforts of the others is individually more beneficial. In our study we combine both settings. We test whether students' behavior in a standard public good game is correlated with their contribution behavior in a group assignment which is part of a university course. The public good game is incorporated into an extensive online survey which is also used to

measure the students' performance in the group assignment and to collect data on other potentially relevant factors. Among others, we control for individual motivation and possession of course-relevant skills, the social cohesion of the group, and the use of sanctions towards underperforming group members. Preliminary results suggest a positive correlation of the contribution behavior in both settings. Students who are more cooperative in the online PGG also contribute a significantly higher quality of work to the group assignment. We also find a positive and weakly significant correlation between contributions in the online PGG and time invested in the group assignment.