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Vienna Center for Experimental Economics

Annual Report 2019





The VCEE laboratory

Foreword

The VCEE remains the very lively and active place for experimental research in economics at the University of Vienna. Instead of a longer verbal foreword, for this report we are offering a visual review of VCEE's many activities in 2019, much like authors sometimes offering visual abstracts of their papers. Please see the next page.

In good old verbal fashion I mention, however, that last year Axel Sonntag left the VCEE to concentrate on his work for the competence center Insight Austria. Moreover, I am happy to report that Linda Dezső joined the VCEE last year on a Hertha Firnberg Postdoctoral Grant and that we hired two wonderful new junior colleagues during the last job-market season: Si Chen will join us from the University of Bonn (Germany) and Yan Xu will join us from the Erasmus University in Rotterdam (The Netherlands).

Wieland Müller,
Managing Director of the VCEE



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Imprint

Geoffrey Castillo
Sebastian Ertner

VCEE in 2019

A few numbers



Executive Summary

Purpose of the Center

The Vienna Center of Experimental Economics (VCEE) provides the infrastructure for conducting experimental research at the University of Vienna and is a forum for the discussion and the exchange of ideas.

The primary focus of the VCEE is to investigate the relevance of bounded rationality and social preferences in the economy, society and the state. In addition, the VCEE contributes to research and teaching in other branches of experimental economics and to the development of experimental methods and behavioral economic theory.

Laboratory experiments are an important tool of research in economics. To be able to use this method effectively, we operate a 150 m² state-of-the-art experimental laboratory located on the premises of the University Campus. The lab includes 28 workstations and a control room. Operations began in the autumn of 2011. Today, we can draw on a pool of several thousand subjects for recruiting and ran close to 3,000 subjects through the lab in 2019.

VCEE primarily serves the research needs of its own members and provides infrastructure for research in experimental economics at the University of Vienna more generally. However, experienced experimentalists from other institutions and universities are welcome to submit applications for using our laboratory facilities. We try to accommodate all suitable applications. In case of capacity constraints, internal applications (by VCEE members; members of the faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics; researchers at other faculties of the University of Vienna) are prioritized over external ones (researchers from other institutions in Austria and abroad). Applicants are requested to consult our guidelines for users which can be obtained from the lab manager.

The VCEE is more than just an experimental lab. We aim at engaging in debate and intellectual exchange in all aspects of experimental economics. Since experiments can be used to investigate almost all joined issues in economics and the social sciences, we are open to a broad range of issues and research questions as long as the investigations are methodologically sound and ethically unproblematic. We particularly

welcome interaction with researchers from management, political science, psychology or sociology.

To promote intellectual exchange and to provide a platform for debate, we organize workshops, run an active seminar series for internal and external presenters and maintain our network of experienced academics as affiliates.

VCEE is also a hub for education in behavioral and experimental economics at the University of Vienna. We offer a broad range of courses on experimental methods and its applications at the Master level and educate about half a dozen of PhD students.

Research and Publications

Research at the VCEE resulted in 12 publications in 2019. Members of the VCEE have presented on-going research at various conferences. Specific research topics studied include:

- » Reduction of loss aversion
- » Social preferences
- » Preference reversals
- » Cooperation and trust
- » Fairness and intuition
- » Price competition for experience goods
- » Expressive voting
- » Influence of poverty and social status on individual decision-making
- » Gambler's fallacy and the hot-hand fallacy
- » Information sharing and extortionary corruption
- » Money illusion
- » Experimental methodology
- » Motivation of voters and the quality of democratic choice
- » Risk aversion related to cognitive ability
- » Consistency and structure of time preferences
- » Strategies for the establishment of trust
- » Belief formation

Workshops, visitors and international networking

In order to strengthen its international research network and visibility, the VCEE maintains an active visitor program. In 2019, we have hosted 17 short-term visitors from institutions such as Tilburg University, the Norwegian School of Economics Bergen, the University of Munich, University College London, the University of Warwick, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Toulouse School of Economics, and many more. In addition to continuing its successful seminar series and its annual Away-day, the VCEE has organized workshops, talks and seminars in 2019 such as the Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics and seminars of the Vienna Behavioral Economics Network.

Teaching

Our faculty continues to offer a large number of courses on Experimental and Behavioral Economics:

- » Geoffrey Castillo taught the course “Designing Economic Experiments”;
- » Linda Dezső taught the course “Economic Psychology”;
- » Victor González Jimenez taught the courses “Behavioral Economics” and “The challenge of Poverty”;
- » Christian Koch taught the courses “Principles of Behavioral and Experimental Economics” and “Topics in Behavioral and Experimental Economics”;
- » Martin Kocher taught the course “Designing Economic Experiments”;
- » Philipp Külpmann taught the course “Designing Economic Experiments”;
- » Wieland Müller taught the courses “Decision and Game Theory”, “Seminar in Experimental Economics” and “Research seminar in Microeconomics”;
- » Alexander K. Wagner taught the courses “Principles of Public Economics”, “Topics in data-driven decision making” and “Topics in Applied Behavioral and Experimental Economics”.

People at VCEE

Faculty



[Martin Kocher](#) is co-director of VCEE. He is also the Director of the Institute for Higher Studies and holds a visiting professorship at the University of Gothenburg.



[Wieland Müller](#) is the current managing director of VCEE. He also holds a professorship at Tilburg University.



[Jean-Robert Tyran](#) is co-director of VCEE. He is currently the Vice-Rector for Research and International Affairs of the University of Vienna. He also holds a professorship at the University of Copenhagen.



[Geoffrey Castillo](#) is senior scientist and co-lab manager.



[Linda Dezső](#) joined us from the Department of Applied Psychology in February 2019.



[Philipp Külpmann](#) is senior scientist and co-lab manager.



[Axel Sonntag](#) was assistant professor at VCEE until July 2019. He is also senior researcher at Insight Austria—Competence Center for Behavioral Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies.



[Alexander K. Wagner](#) is assistant professor at VCEE.



[Victor González Jimenez](#) is assistant professor at the Department of Economics.



[Christian Koch](#) is assistant professor at the Department of Economics.

Affiliate Faculty

Affiliate faculty members are experts in experimental economics who frequently contribute to the activities of the VCEE (e.g. as co-authors, presenters or seminar participants). Current affiliates are:

- » Ben Greiner
- » Melis Kartal
- » Steffen Keck
- » Erich Kirchler
- » Georg Kirchsteiger
- » Bernhard Kittel
- » Boris Maciejovsky
- » Markus Reitzig
- » Rupert Sausgruber
- » Sigrid Suetens
- » Erik Wengström

Research Assistants

In 2019 the following students assisted the research activities at the lab:

- » Sebastian Ertner

- » Lukas Hack
- » Julian Vitus Mayrhuber
- » Anna Osipenko
- » Georg Pointner
- » Michael Raffelsberger
- » Nikita Roshchupkin
- » Matthias Stur
- » Lilla Tolnai
- » Verena Woharcik
- » Justina Wohlrab
- » Sena Ökmen

Current PhD Students

Several PhD students carried out research at the VCEE in 2019. They have all contributed to the effective functioning of the VCEE and to the creation of a vibrant academic atmosphere. They are:

- » Simone Häckl
- » Eryk Kryowski
- » Ilona Reindl
- » Georg Sator
- » Sigma Samhita
- » Dominik Stelzeneder
- » Thomas Stephens

Seminars and events

Visitors

The VCEE maintains a visitor program which provides a platform for the presentation and discussion of recent research activities as well as the exchange of new ideas and developments in the field of experimental research. Short-term visitors usually give a seminar presentation. The following researchers visited VCEE in the year 2019.

- » Jana Friedrichsen, Humboldt University of Berlin/German Institute for Economic Research, Germany, January 25
- » Dirk Engelmann, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, January 25
- » Marie Claire Villeval, French National Center for Scientific Research, France, March 19
- » Klaus Wertenbroch, European Institute of Business Administration, France, May 22
- » Ghazala Azmat, Paris Institute of Political Studies, France, September 9–10
- » Saurabh Bhargava, Carnegie Mellon University, US, September 9–10
- » Leonardo Bursztyn, University of Chicago, US, September 9–10
- » Marco Faravelli, University of Queensland, Australia, September 9–10
- » Sebastian Goerg, Technical University of Munich, Germany, September 9–10
- » Ben Greiner, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria, September 9–10
- » Ulf Zölitz, University of Zurich, Switzerland, September 9–10
- » Jens Noll, FehrAdvice & Partners, Switzerland, October 18

- » Ferdinand von Siemens, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany, October 18
- » Sabine Kröger, Université Laval, Canada, November 15
- » Charles Bellemare, Université Laval, Canada, November 15
- » Kirsten Rohde, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands, December 13
- » Fabio Galeotti, University of Lyon, France, December 13

8th VCEE Away-day

The two-day workshop was held on June 13–14, 2019, in Reichenau an der Rax. The Away-day serves as a platform to develop new research and to present ongoing research at the VCEE.

Organizers

- » Geoffrey Castillo
- » Philipp Külpmann

Speakers

- » Geoffrey Castillo
- » Linda Dezső
- » Simone Häckl
- » Victor González Jimenez
- » Christian Koch
- » Georg Sator
- » Axel Sonntag
- » Dominik Stelzeneder
- » Alexander K. Wagner

Other Participants

- » Martin Kocher

For the full program please see [here](#).

Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics

The Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics was held on September 9–10, 2019, in the Executive Academy of the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

The purpose of this workshop is to bring together a small group of researchers to discuss recent and prospective developments in the field of behavioral public economics.

Organizers

- » Rupert Sausgruber, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
- » Jean-Robert Tyran, University of Vienna, Austria

Speakers

- » Ghazala Azmat, Paris Institute of Political Studies, France
- » Saurabh Bhargava, Carnegie Mellon University, US
- » Leonardo Bursztyn, University of Chicago, US
- » Marco Faravelli, University of Queensland, Australia
- » Sebastian Goerg, Technical University of Munich, Germany
- » Ben Greiner, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria

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- » Jean-Robert Tyran, University of Vienna, Austria
- » Ulf Zölitz, University of Zurich, Switzerland

Other Participants

- » Esther Arenas-Arroyo
- » Ralph Bayer
- » Linda Dezső
- » Christine Grimm
- » Kerstin Grosch
- » Philipp Külpmann
- » Simone Häckl
- » Gergely Hajdu
- » Stefan Halbauer
- » Ingrid Hoem Sjørnsen
- » Christian Koch
- » Anand Murugesan
- » Sigma Samhita
- » Anna-Magdalena Schwarz
- » Axel Sonntag
- » Dominik Stelzeneder
- » Thomas Alexander Stephens
- » Alexander K. Wagner
- » Elisabeth Wurm
- » Anita Zednik

For the full program see [here](#).

Vienna Behavioral Economics Network

The Vienna Behavioral Economics Network (VBEN) events facilitate the exchange between scientists, practitioners and the general public. They are organized by members of the VCEE and FehrAdvice & Partners, a consulting company.

Marie Claire Villeval: Teamwork & Leadership



On March 19, 2019, Marie Claire Villeval talked about “Teamwork & Leadership”.

Speaker: Marie Claire Villeval (French National Center for Scientific Research)

Klaus Wertenbroch: Laziness and (mis)behavior



On May 22, 2019, Klaus Wertenbroch talked about “Laziness and (mis)behavior”.

Speaker: Klaus Wertenbroch (European Institute of Business Administration)

Leonardo Bursztyn: Understanding Peer Pressure in Education – From Evidence to Policy



On September 10, 2019, Leonardo Bursztyn talked about “Understanding Peer Pressure in Education – From Evidence to Policy”.

Speaker: Leonardo Bursztyn (University of Chicago)

Research outputs

Publications

“Self-serving invocations of shared and asymmetric history in negotiations”

[Linda Dezső](#) and George Loewenstein
European Economic Review

“Are consumption taxes really disliked more than equivalent costs? Inconclusive results in the USA and no effect in the UK”

Jerome Olsen, Christoph Kogler, Mark J. Brandt, [Linda Dezső](#) and Erico Kirchler
Journal of Economic Psychology

“Risk, time pressure, and selection effects”

[Martin G. Kocher](#), David Schindler, Stefan T. Trautmann and Yilong Xu
Experimental Economics

“Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines”

Emin Karagözoğlu and [Martin G. Kocher](#)
Experimental Economics

“Probabilistic transitivity in sports”

Johannes Tiwisina and [Philipp Külpmann](#)
Computers & Operations Research

“Personal accountability and cooperation in teams”

[Axel Sonntag](#) and Daniel John Zizzo
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

“The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting”

Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan and [Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
Games and Economic Behavior

“Risking Other People’s Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits”

Ola Andersson, Hakan Holm, [Jean-Robert Tyran](#) and Erik Wengström
Scandinavian Journal of Economics

“Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice”

Lydia Mechtenberg and [Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
Games and Economic Behavior

“Where Power Resides in Committees”

Georg D. Granic and [Alexander K. Wagner](#)
The Leadership Quarterly

“Jean-Robert Tyran Recommends “Patience and the Wealth of Nations” by Thomas Dohmen, Benjamin Enke, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde”

[Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
In B. S. Frey, & C. Schaltegger (Eds.), 21st Century Economics: Economic Ideas You Should Read and Remember (pp. 135–136). Springer

“Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting”

[Jean-Robert Tyran](#) and [Alexander K. Wagner](#)
In R. Congleton, B. Grofman, & S. Voigt (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Public Choice (Vol. 2, pp. 928–940). Oxford University Press

Working Papers

“Self-serving invocations of shared and asymmetric history in negotiations”

[Linda Dezső](#) and George Loewenstein

The existence of an asymmetric history between bargaining partners can trigger self-serving beliefs about the fair settlement of a subsequent dispute, ultimately leading to bargaining impasse. In a two-stage bargaining experiment, we demonstrate that dyads who share a history that produced wealth asymmetries between them are less likely to settle in a subsequent negotiation than when the same wealth asymmetry stems from partners’ independent histories. When partners share an asymmetric history, the individual who previously lost out in the first stage believes that s/he deserves compensation in the second-stage, but the individual who prevailed in the first stage believes that compensation is not called for. These divergent, self-serving, views about a fair settlement – and the resulting irreconcilable demands – lead to bargaining impasse. We find, fur-

ther, that unbiased spectators side with the losers in the first stage; they believe that it is fair for them to be compensated in the second stage. Indeed, this is true albeit to a lesser extent, even if the winner and loser had not directly interacted with one-another – i.e., if the history is not shared.

“Tax compliance and compliance norms among the unfairly underpaid”

[Linda Dezső](#), Dániel Kalotai, Erico Kirchler and James Alm

A common finding in the experimental tax compliance literature is that, when people perceive the tax system as unfair to them, their tax compliance decreases. However, no prior research addresses whether tax compliance is reduced after underpayment from a party independent from the tax system (e.g., an employer) and, if so, whether the cause of underpayment matters (e.g., whether it is due to “bad luck” versus intentional human actions). We address these questions in a laboratory experiment that utilizes a one-shot income-reporting game. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three treatments that varied the reason for underpayment on a real-effort task while keeping subjects’ incomes constant: random underpayment versus intentional underpayment, with no underpayment as the baseline treatment. Subjects’ beliefs about their similarly-treated peers’ mean compliance were also elicited, at the same time that they made their compliance choices. We find that, when the underpayment occurs randomly (or due to bad luck), tax compliance levels and beliefs about the prevailing compliance norms are the same as in the baseline treatment. However, when the underpayment is perceived as intentional and so as unfair, beliefs about the prevailing compliance norms erode and compliance levels drop. Causal mediation analysis reveals that tax compliance is decreased via two routes: half of the decrease is a direct result of perceptions that underpayment is intentional and unfair, while the remainder is due to the corrupted beliefs about compliance norms.

“Contracting Probability Distortions”

[Victor González Jiménez](#)

I introduce a contract designed to take advantage of the regularity that individuals distort probabilities. With this contract, the principal could activate the probability distortions that are inherent in the agent and use these distortions to incentivize the agent to perform a relevant task. This is because in the contract, the principal could choose the probability that the agent’s compensation depends on his own performance on the task. Distortions of such probability generate higher or lower motivation to perform the task. A theoretical framework and an experiment demonstrate that the proposed contract yields higher output than a traditional contract when both contracts offer similar monetary

incentives. However, the probability specified by the principal is critical to achieving this result. Small probabilities yield higher levels of performance, whereas medium or high probabilities yield no performance differences between the contracts. The degree to which individuals overweight small probabilities explains these findings.

“Information defaults in repeated public good provision”

Jia Liu, [Axel Sonntag](#) and Daniel Zizzo

We present an experiment that models a repeated public good provision setting where the policy maker or manager does not have perfect control over information flows. Rather, information seeking can be affected by changing the information default as well as the price of information. The default is one either with or without information about others’ contributions, and having information comes with a positive, zero or negative financial incentive. When information comes without a financial incentive or even is financially beneficial, almost all subjects choose to have the information, but around a third have the information even when this is costly. Moreover, a default of not having information about the others’ contributions leads to a slower unravelling of cooperation, independent of the financial incentives of having information. This slower unravelling is explained by the beliefs about others’ contributions in these treatments. A secondary informational default effect appears to take place. When the default is no information, subjects do not seek information more often but, conditional on financial incentives, they tend to believe that more other subjects seek information.

“Framed Payslips and People’s Reactions to Labor Tax Changes”

Claus Ghesla and [Axel Sonntag](#)

Payslips are supposed to notify employees about wage-related information, enabling them to adjust their labor supply, when appropriate. However, payslips are often information-laden and complex to understand, casting doubt on whether they are adequately up to the task, potentially resulting in inefficient labor supply reactions. In a real-effort laboratory experiment we use a variety of information frames to potentially support a better understanding of wage related information. We find that participants strongly react to changes of incidental wage costs, yet the framing of payslips has no additional effect on people’s labor supply. Nevertheless, including simple graphics increases comprehension and readability.

“Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy”

Rupert Sausgruber, [Axel Sonntag](#) and [Jean-Robert Tyran](#)

We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing

work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.

“Focality is Intuitive — Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games”

Anders Poulsen and [Axel Sonntag](#)

We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coordination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games, there are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly focal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric games, less time results in greater focality of the label-salient action, and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the focal outcome.

“Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good”

Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman and [Jean-Robert Tyran](#)

Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a “leverage effect” because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.

“Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time”

Morten Hedegaard, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Daniel Müller and [Jean-Robert Tyran](#)

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior.

Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality contribute more to the public good and are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.

Talks and presentations

“How does lottery representation affect risk attitudes?”

[Geoffrey Castillo](#)

Network for Integrated Behavioural Sciences workshop, Coventry, United Kingdom

18 Sep 2019

“Incorporating social distances into economics”

[Geoffrey Castillo](#)

14th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Kiel, Germany

28 Sep 2019

“The dark side of underpayment inequity: Corrupted tax compliance and compliance norms among the unfairly underpaid”

[Linda Dezső](#)

Thurgau Experimental Economics Meeting 2019, Kreuzlingen, Switzerland

18 Apr 2019

“Contracting Probability Distortions”

[Victor González-Jimenez](#)

Workshop on Behavioral Economic Decision Sciences, Leicester, United Kingdom

24 May 2019

“Evaluating treatment effects and replicability”

[Victor González-Jimenez](#)

18th TIBER conference, Tilburg, Netherlands

25 Aug 2019

“Social Signaling in Ex-Ante Self-Assessments — Gender Differences and Behavioral Consequences”

[Simone Häckl](#)

Asia-Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

24 Jan 2019

“Social Signaling in Ex-Ante Self-Assessments — Gender Differences and Behavioral Consequences”
[Simone Häckl](#)
Economic Science Association European Meeting (EESA), Dijon, France
6 Sep 2019

“Social Signaling in Ex-Ante Self-Assessments — Gender Differences and Behavioral Consequences”
[Simone Häckl](#)
14th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics (NCBEE), Kiel, Germany
27 Oct 2019

“7th eeecon Lecture”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria
19 Mar 2019

“Time pressure in bidding”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
4 Apr 2019

“Time pressure in bidding”
[Martin Kocher](#)
GATE Lyon St-Etienne, Lyon, France
5 Apr 2019

“Time pressure in bidding”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
12 Apr 2019

“Understanding dishonest behavior”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Universität Zürich (UZH), Zurich, Switzerland
16 Apr 2019

“Cooperation in a company: A large-scale experiment”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland
17 Apr 2019

“Cooperation in a company: A large-scale experiment”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Verein für Socialpolitik, Reissensburg, Germany
9 May 2019

“Was beeinflusst (un-)moralisches Verhalten in der Wirtschaft?”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU), Vienna, Austria
15 May 2019

“Cooperation in a company: A large-scale experiment”
[Martin Kocher](#)
16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Hongkong, China
6 Jun 2019

“Cheating on labor markets”
[Martin Kocher](#)
European Workshop in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Tilburg, Netherlands
18 Jun 2019

“More opportunity, more cooperation”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
22 Jun 2019

“Time pressure in Bidding”
[Martin Kocher](#)
World Meetings of the Economic Science Association (ESA), Zurich, Switzerland
6 Jul 2019

“Cheating on labor markets”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Economic Science Association European Conference, Cologne, Germany
5 Sep 2019

“Cheating on labor markets”
[Martin Kocher](#)
University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom
15 Oct 2019

“Cooperation in a company: A large-scale experiment”
[Martin Kocher](#)
University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
6 Dec 2019

“On the Predictive Power of Theories of One-Shot Play”
[Philipp Külpmann](#)
12th Maastricht Behavioral Experimental Economics Symposium, Maastricht, Netherlands
3 Jun 2019

“On the Predictive Power of Theories of One-Shot Play”
[Philipp Külpmann](#)
10th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics, Toulouse, France
20 Jun 2019

“Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism”
[Wiend Müller](#)
The Neoclassical Repair Shop and its Alternatives: Workshop in honor of Werner Güth's 75th birthday, Berlin, Germany
2 Feb 2019

“Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism”
[Wieland Müller](#)
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom
13 Mar 2019

“Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism”
[Wieland Müller](#)
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
14 Mar 2019

“Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism”
[Wieland Müller](#)
National Research University, Moscow, Russian Federation
11 Jun 2019

“Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism”
[Wieland Müller](#)
Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon (ENS Lyon), Lyon, France
9 Oct 2019

“Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism”
[Wieland Müller](#)
University of Economics Prague, Prague, Czech Republic
31 Oct 2019

“Gradualism in the Field”
[Sigma Samhita](#)
University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
23 Jan 2019

“Disincentives from Redistribution — Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy”
[Axel Sonntag](#)
Burgundy School of Business, Dijon, France
26 Mar 2019

“Nudging students for success”
[Axel Sonntag](#)
Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria
4 Apr 2019

“Focality is intuitive — Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games”
[Axel Sonntag](#)
Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Graz, Austria
25 Apr 2019

“Focality is intuitive — Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games”
[Axel Sonntag](#)
Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
2 May 2019

“Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good”
[Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France
19 Feb 2019

“Fake news, overconfidence and the quality of democratic choice”
[Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Venice, Italy
1 Apr 2019

“Fake news, overconfidence and the quality of democratic choice”
[Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
California Institute of Technology (Caltech), California, United States
6 May 2019

“Can democracy ever work? A behavioral and experimental economics perspective”
[Jean-Robert Tyran](#)
Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO), Vienna, Austria
5 Jul 2019

Outreach

“Zur Lage der österreichischen Wirtschaft und den notwendigen Strukturreformen”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Benedikt Kautsky Kreis, Leonfelden, Austria
4 Jan 2019

“Hat die Wirtschaft ihr Vertrauenskapital verspielt”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Bayerische Staatskanzlei, Munich, Germany
15 Mar 2019

“Konjunkturrückgang — Alarmzeichen für den Budgetpfad der Regierung”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Diplomatische Akademie Wien, Vienna, Austria
24 Apr 2019

“20 Jahre Rechnungshof Vorarlberg”
[Martin Kocher](#)
Landtag Vorarlberg, Bregenz, Austria
6 May 2019

“Wie bringt man die Bevölkerung dazu, Prävention zu machen”

[Martin Kocher](#)

4. PRAEVENIRE Gesundheitstage 2019, Seitenstetten, Austria

16 May 2019

“Wirtschaftsparlament”

[Martin Kocher](#)

Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKO), Vienna, Austria

27 Jun 2019

“Behavioral economics and precautionary decisions”

[Martin Kocher](#)

EAPSPI Pensions Policy Committee, Vienna, Austria

16 Sep 2019

“Arbeitsmarkt, Digitalisierung und Zukunft der Arbeit”

[Martin Kocher](#)

Arbeitsmarktservice (AMS), Vienna, Austria

10 Oct 2019

“Was beeinflusst (un-)moralisches Verhalten in der Wirtschaft?”

[Martin Kocher](#)

Fachtagung 2019 — Institut Österreichischer Wirtschaftsprüfer, Vienna, Austria

12 Oct 2019

“Gute Zeiten für Jobsuchende, schlechte Zeiten für Betriebe — brauchen wir einen Masterplan für den Arbeitsmarkt?”

[Martin Kocher](#)

Wirtschaftskammer Tirol, Innsbruck, Austria

23 Oct 2019

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National EMN Conference 2019, Vienna, Austria

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