



VCEE Away Day 2019

Program



VCEE Away Day 2019

For this year's away day, we will not only enjoy 9 talks but also the hospitality of the Flackl-Wirt in Reichenau an der Rax.

Travel information

We are meeting on Thursday at Wien Hauptbahnhof, platform 1 at 9:20. From there we are going to take the train (R 2391) to Payerbach-Reichenau. In case you are not traveling with us, please inform me (Philipp) beforehand.



List of participants

- » Geoffrey Castillo
- » Linda Dezső
- » Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez
- » Simone Häckl
- » Christian Koch
- » Martin Kocher
- » Philipp Külpmann
- » Georg Sator
- » Axel Sonntag
- » Dominik Stelzeneder
- » Alexander K. Wagner

Program

Thursday, June 13

- 9:20 Meeting at Wien Hbf (platform 1)
- 9:29 Departure from Wien Hbf
- 11:08 Arrival at Payerbach-Reichenau and transfer to the Flackl-Wirt
- 11:30 Check-in
- 12:00 Lunch at the hotel
- 13:45 Talk: Geoffrey Castillo
- 14:30 Talk: Alexander K. Wagner
- 15:15 Talk: Linda Dezső
- 16:00 Coffee break
- 16:30 Talk: Georg Sator
- 17:15 Talk: Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez
- 18:00 Talk: Dominik Stelzeneder
- 19:00 Dinner at the hotel

Friday, June 14

- before 10 Breakfast and check-out
- 10:00 Talk: Simone Häckl
- 11:00 Talk: Christian Koch
- 11:30 Talk: Axel Sonntag
- 12:30 Lunch at the hotel
- afterwards Trip back
or a hike in the area

Trip back

For the trip back you are on your own. You can do it! From the station Payerbach-Reichenau a train to Vienna central station is leaving every 30 minutes. Don't forget to buy a ticket (for 3 or more people, you can buy a "Einfach Raus" ticket).

Hike

If weather permits, I will organize a hike in the area for anyone interested. It will take place on Friday after lunch.

Abstracts

Thursday, June 13

Geoffrey Castillo “Incorporating Social Distances into Economics”

Alexander K. Wagner “Small Worlds”

Linda Dezsó “Divergent Views About the Implication of Contribution History on Redistributive Fairness”

Georg Sator “Peer effects and social closeness”

We introduce social closeness to the economic literature on peer effects. We divide subjects into observed and observing voluntary contributors to a public good and systematically vary the social closeness between observed and observing subject. Our design allows us to carefully demarcate peer effects from confounding factors such as similarity of preferences or information spillover. We find a clear impact of social closeness on peer effects: observed subjects make more pro-social choices when their reputation is at stake and observing subjects imitate their peer more closely with increased social closeness.

Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez “The Dark Side of Monetary Bonuses” (with *Charles Noussair and Patricio Dalton*)

To incentivize workers and boost performance, firms often offer monetary bonuses for the achievement of production goals. Such bonuses encompass two types of motivations for the worker. On the one hand, the existence of a goal, on its own, triggers an intrinsic motivation associated to the desire of not falling short of the target. On the other hand, the money paid to achieve the goal is an extrinsic motivation for the worker to work harder. This paper studies whether and how monetary bonuses incentivizing the achievement of self-chosen goals can crowd out the intrinsic motivation that the goal creates. We develop a theoretical model which predicts that if the worker is sufficiently loss-averse, offering a monetary payment to reach a goal would be counterproductive. This is because the loss-averse worker sets lower goals, which in turn negatively affect performance. Results from a controlled laboratory experiment corroborate this prediction. This paper highlights the limits of monetary bonuses as an effective incentive when goals are self-chosen.

Dominik Stelzeneder “Causal Effects of Schooling on Political Preferences. Experimental Evidence”

Abstracts

Friday, June 14

Simone Häckl “Increasing Children’s Interest in STEM”

In this study, we run a field experiment in which we use a digital platform to increase children’s interest in STEM-related fields. The digital platform aims at reducing stereotypical thinking about STEM occupations and incorporates mini games that are related to STEM fields. By using economic experiments as well as surveys, we identify different channels influencing children’s interest in STEM.

Christian Koch “Experimental Design Idea: Do (some) people have an altruistic motivation in behaving pro-socially?”

Axel Sonntag “Information Defaults in Repeated Public Good Provision” (with *Daniel Zizzo and Jia Liu*)

We present an experiment on information defaults and information seeking in a repeated public good provision setting. In our experiment, the default is one either with or without information about others’ contributions, and having information comes with a positive, zero or negative financial incentive. When information comes without a financial incentive or even is financially beneficial, subjects choose to have the information, but around a third have the information even when this is costly. Moreover, a default of not having information about the others’ contributions leads to a slower unraveling of cooperation, independent of the financial incentives of having information. This slower unraveling is explained by the beliefs about others’ contributions in these treatments. A secondary informational default effect appears to take place. When the default is no information, subjects do not seek information more often but, conditional on considering financial incentives, they tend to believe that more other subjects seek information.



universität
wien

Flackl-Wirt

Hinterleiten 12
2651 Reichenau / Rax
Phone: 0043-2666-52291
www.flackl.at

Train station: Payerbach-Reichenau Bahnhof

Organizers:

Geoffrey Castillo (geoffrey.castillo@univie.ac.at)
Philipp Külpmann (philipp.kuelpmann@univie.ac.at)

Title page image by Paul Gilmore, all other images by Flackl-Wirt



Vienna Center for Experimental Economics

University of Vienna
Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
1090 Vienna, Austria
vcee.univie.ac.at