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VIENNA CENTER FOR EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
ANNUAL REPORT 2013



ANNUAL REPORT 2013

Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)

ANNUAL REPORT for the period of 01.01.2013 – 31.12.2013

Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)


<http://vcee.univie.ac.at>

Offices

Faculty of Business, Economics and
Statistics
Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
1090 Vienna
Austria

Experimental Laboratory

Altes AKH Campus
Spitalgasse 2
Hof 1, 1.1
1090 Vienna
Austria



Participants taking part in an experiment at the laboratory facilities on the Campus. The lab had more than 2,700 subject participations in 2013.

FOREWORD

The Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE) was formally established in January 2011 as an institution within the Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics at the University of Vienna.

The purpose of the Center is to provide infrastructure for conducting experimental research at the University of Vienna and to facilitate the discussion and exchange of ideas in that field. VCEE is jointly directed by Wieland Müller and Jean-Robert Tyran, with the position of managing director alternating between the two.

In the past year, the VCEE has again grown substantially. In particular, the number of projects conducted in the lab in 2013 more than doubled with respect to 2012 (9 vs 23), with the number of subject participations almost tripling (1,076 vs 2,750). We are optimistic that these experiments will result in numerous working papers and publications in the years to come. We continue to improve the research facilities at the lab, ultimately aiming to enable also the conduct of internet and field experiments. The growth of the Center is also reflected in the three M.A. theses that were supervised by VCEE faculty in 2013.

Due to the research efforts of the Center's academics, over the past year three publications and 10 working papers have been completed successfully. Perhaps more importantly, research papers by VCEE faculty were accepted for publication by top economics journals such as the *American Economic Review*, *Review of Economic Studies* and *Economic Journal*. This substantially increases the national and the international visibility of the VCEE. Moreover, VCEE members have continued to actively participate in international workshops and to present their work at conferences and seminars. External researchers have also been welcomed to the VCEE — in 2013 more than 30 academics visited the Center, with many of those taking the opportunity to present their research. In addition to the regular seminar series, the VCEE hosted a workshop in Behavioral Public Economics.

The VCEE has not only been successful in research and publication activities, but has also invested considerable efforts in teaching. Experimental economics has continued to gain popularity among students and we are very pleased to supervise the work of seven PhD students and numerous Master theses.

Wieland Müller
Managing Director VCEE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of the Center

The Vienna Center of Experimental Economics (VCEE) provides infrastructure for conducting experimental research at the University of Vienna and is a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas.

The primary focus of the VCEE is to investigate the relevance of bounded rationality and social preferences in the economy, society and the state. In addition, the VCEE contributes to research and teaching in other branches of experimental economics and to the development of experimental methods and behavioral economic theory.

Laboratory experiments are an important tool of research in economics. To this end, the VCEE operates a 150 m² state-of-the-art experimental laboratory located on the premises of the University Campus. The lab includes 28 workstations and a control room. Operations began in fall 2011.

Experienced experimentalists are welcome to submit applications for using our laboratory facilities. We try to accommodate all suitable appli-

cations. In case of capacity constraints, internal applications (by VCEE members; members of the faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics; researchers at other faculties of the University of Vienna) are prioritized over external ones (researchers from other institutions in Austria and abroad). Applicants are requested to consult our guidelines for users which can be obtained from the lab manager.

The VCEE is more than just an experimental lab. We aim at engaging in debate and intellectual exchange in all aspects of experimental economics. Since experiments can be used to investigate almost all issues in economics and the social sciences, we aim to maintain an openness concerning the substance of research. We particularly welcome interaction with researchers from other fields like political science, psychology or sociology. To this end, we run an active series of VCEE research seminars for internal and external presenters and plan to further expand our network of experienced academics as affiliates.

Research and Publications

Research at the VCEE resulted in three publications in 2013. Members of the VCEE have published 11 working papers and on-going research has been presented at various conferences.

Specific research topics studied include:



- The voluntary provision of public goods and voting in formal vs. informal sanctioning environments
- Various aspects of social preferences and rationality
- Bargaining and coalition formation
- Effects of deliberation and experience on voting on taxes
- Asymmetric information, abstention and coordination in standing committees
- Elicitation of risk and time preferences
- Tax evasion and charitable giving
- Feedback and learning in games
- Share issues and repurchases

Workshops, visitors and international networking

In order to strengthen its international research network and its international visibility, the VCEE is striving to maintain an active visitor program. In 2013, we have been able to host more than 30 short-term visitors from places such as Sydney, NYU, Brown U, as well as various places in Europe such as Tilburg, Rome, PSE Paris,

Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oxford, Zurich and many more.

The VCEE has hosted a Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics in September 2013 and has continued to expand the scope of its seminar series.

Teaching

The VCEE faculty continues to offer a large number of courses on Experimental and Behavioral Economics. Recent courses by Jean-Robert Tyran include a lecture on “Behavioral and Experimental Economics” and two seminars on “Rethinking Public Economics” and “Topics in Behavioral and Experimental Economics” for Masters students, as well as a post-graduate block course in “Behavioral Finance”. Natalia Shestakova, James Tremewan and Melis Kartal jointly offer a seminar course on “Designing and Implementing an Economic Experiment”. James Tremewan also teaches “Bargaining and Coalition Formation, Theory and Experiments.” Next year Wieland Müller will again offer a PhD course in “Experimental Economics” at the Vienna Graduate School of Economics (VGSE).

ORGANIZATION, FACULTY AND STAFF

The VCEE thanks all collaborators for their efforts in ensuring the smooth operations of the laboratory facilities and for creating ideal conditions for effective research.

The VCEE is jointly directed by Wieland Müller and Jean-Robert Tyran, with the position of managing director alternating between the two. Müller also holds a professorship in Tilburg and Tyran a professorship in Copenhagen.

The activities of the laboratory are managed by Owen Powell, who heads a team of student assistants employed on a part-time basis. Administrative support is mainly provided by Sandra Weissenböck (head administrator) and Sylvie Hansbauer (accounting), while IT support is handled by Andreas Öller.

The VCEE and the Department of Economics have jointly made extensive efforts to attract highly qualified and talented junior faculty to Vienna. Our efforts have been extraordinarily successful, which we are extremely proud of. The junior faculty currently consists of:

Owen Powell is the manager of the lab. He received a PhD from Tilburg University and joined us in 2011 after visiting Carlos III of Madrid as an assistant professor. His main research interests are in the fields of experimental finance, behavioral economics, growth and growth accounting.

Melis Kartal holds a PhD from New York University and joined us in 2012



as an assistant professor. Some of her research interests include micro-economic theory, experimental economics and political economy.

Natalia Shestakova holds a PhD from CERGE-EI in Prague and joined us in 2011 as an assistant professor. Her main research interests are in behavioral economics, contract theory and industrial organization.

James Tremewan received a PhD from the Toulouse School of Economics and joined us in 2011 as an assistant professor. He is mainly interested in multilateral bargaining, coalition formation, and belief elicitation.

Affiliate faculty members are experts in experimental economics who frequently contribute to the activities of the VCEE (e.g. as co-authors, presenters or seminar participants). Current affiliates are:

Bernhard Kittel (U Vienna)
Rupert Sausgruber (WU Vienna)
Erik Wengström (Copenhagen)
Sigrid Suetens (Tilburg U)
Adam Zylbersztejn (WU Vienna)

The research activities at the lab were assisted by the following students in 2013:

- Florian Acker
- Anna Albert
- Lucía Baratech
- Anna Dimitrova
- Guntram Kelz
- Mila Laleva
- Milica Nikolic
- Joé Rieff
- Manuel Schwaninger
- Pablo Torija

Several PhD and MA students carried out research at the VCEE in 2013. They have all contributed to the effective functioning of the VCEE and to the creation of a vibrant academic atmosphere.

Current PhD students

- **Eryk Kryowski:**
discrimination, anonymity, behavioral public economics
- **Christopher Nell:**
public economics, tax evasion
- **Fernando Quevedo:**
behavioral game theory and industrial organization
- **Alexander Rabas:**
labour economics, gender wage gap, personality
- **Florian Spitzer:**
trust and reputation, credence goods, antisocial preferences
- **Thomas Stephens:**
redistribution and taxation, bounded rationality, honesty
- **Elke Weidenholzer:**
decision making by children

Completed Masters Theses

- **Maximilian Höly:** “Stochastic fundamentals and multiple regimes in an experimental double auction asset market”
- **Georg Kanitsar:** “Social preferences in voting on redistribution”
- **Joé Rieff:** “Culture, institutions and cooperation”
- **Nataliya Schönleitner:** “The possibility of implementing dynamic pricing in low income countries: a case study on the Ukrainian electricity market”

Visitors

The VCEE is actively involved in the organisation of a visitor program, which provides a platform for the presentation and discussion of recent research activities, as well as the exchange of new ideas and developments in the field of experimental research. Short-term visitors usually give a seminar presentation.

Pablo GUILLEN (U Sydney), Jan. 8, 2013

Antonio MASTROGIORGIO (U Rome), Jan. 18, 2013

Johann GRAF LAMBSDORFF (U Passau), Jan. 18, 2013

Andy SCHOTTER (NYU), Jan. 31, 2013

Andrew CLARK (PSE Paris), March 8, 2013

Tore ELLINGSEN (SSE Stockholm), March 14, 2013

Florian MORATH (MPI Munich), March 15, 2013

Dasa KATRENIKOVA (CERGE Prague), April 12, 2013

Jonathan SCHULZ (U Nottingham), May 17, 2013

Fangfang TAN (MPI Munich), May 17, 2013

Ulrik NIELSEN (U Copenhagen), June 14, 2013

Frédéric SCHNEIDER (U Zürich), June 14, 2013

Louis PUTTERMAN (Brown U), Sept. 16-22, 2013

Daniel CHEN (ETH Zurich), Sept. 18-20, 2013

David GILL (Oxford U), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Guillaume FRÉCHETTE (New York U), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Martin KOCHER (LMU Munich), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Thomas MARKUSSEN (U Copenhagen), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Ragan PETRIE (George Mason U), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Moses SHAYO (Hebrew U), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Carmit SEGAL (U Zurich), Sept. 18-20, 2013

Stepan VESELY (Masaryk U), Oct. 2013 - Jan. 2014

Julia MÜLLER (U Rotterdam), Oct. 18, 2013

Stéphane LUCHINI (GREQAM, Marseille), Oct. 18, 2013

Ulrik NIELSEN (U Copenhagen), Oct. 30-Nov.1, 2013

Helena CHYTILOVA (U Prague), Nov. 1-11, 2013

Jacob GOEREE (U Zurich), Nov. 7, 2013

Elena CETTOLIN (Maastricht U), Nov. 15, 2013

Peter KATUSCAK (CERGE Prague), Nov. 15, 2013

David K. LEVINE (EUI Florence), Nov. 21, 2013

Erik WENGSTRÖM (Lund U), Nov. 27-29, 2013

Pablo GUILLEN ALVAREZ (U Sydney), Dec. 4, 2013

Andreas NICKLISCH (U Hamburg), Dec. 10, 2013

Sebastian FEHRLER (U Zurich), Dec. 13, 2013

Florian SCHÜTT (Tilburg U), Dec. 13, 2013

WORKSHOPS AND SEMINARS

Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics, 19th & 20th September 2013

The purpose of this workshop was to bring together a small group of researchers to discuss recent and prospective developments in the field of behavioural public economics. The workshop was part of the “National Research Network S103” funded by the Austrian Science Fund.

Organizers

Rupert Sausgruber (WU Vienna)
Jean-Robert Tyran (U Vienna)

Presenters:

Daniel Chen (ETH Zurich)
David Gill (Oxford)
Guillaume Fréchette (NYU)
Martin Kocher (U Munich)
Thomas Markussen (U Copenhagen)
Ragan Petrie (George Mason U)
Louis Putterman (Brown U)
Moses Shayo (Hebrew U)
Carmit Segal (U Zurich)
Florian Spitzer (U Vienna)

Other participants:

Tamás Csermely (WU Vienna)
Diana Gaspari (WU Vienna)
Berhard Kittel (U Vienna)
Alexander Rabas (U Vienna)
Nadine Schmid-Greifeneder (WU Vienna)
Thomas Stephens (U Vienna)
Matan Tsur (U Vienna)
Alexander Wagner (U Zurich)
Adam Zylbersztejn (WU Vienna)



Seminars

January 18

Antonio Mastrogiorgio (U Rome):

"Slow and fast thinking: what can Embodied Cognition reveal?"

Johann Graf Lambsdorff (U Passau):

"Sticky Reasoning in Experimental Macroeconomics"

March 8

Andrew Clark (PSE):

"The Value of Diplomacy: Bilateral Relations and Immigrant Well-Being"

March 15

Florian Morath (MPI Munich):

"Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict"

Julia Martins (WU Vienna):

"The Influence of Ethics Training and Income on Cooperation and Tax Morale – An Experimental Analysis"

April 12

Dasa Katreniakova (CERGE-EI):

"Information, Aspiration and Incentives to Learn: A Randomized Field Experiment in Uganda?"

Eryk Krykowski (VGSE):

"Anonymity and Social Norms"

May 17

Fangfang Tan (Max-Planck Institute Munich):

"Success Breeds Success" or "Pride Goes Before a Fall"?

Jonathan Schulz (U Nottingham):

"Strategic Deterrence as a Driver for Overconfidence"

June 12

Jianying Qiu (Radboud U Nijmegen):

"Valuation with Multiple Priors: Experimental Evidence"

June 14

Ulrik Nielsen (U Copenhagen):

"The Long-Term Impact of Parents on their Offspring's Other-Regarding Preferences"

Frédéric Schneider (U Zürich):

"Fear of Commitment: Voluntary Long-Term Interaction and Cooperation"

June 28

Alexander Rabas (U Vienna):
"Comparison of Risk Elicitation Methods"

Adam Zylberstejn (PSE):
"Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-improving Information"

October 18

Julia Müller (U Rotterdam):
"Bargaining Under Uncertainty: An Experiment with Unstructured Communication"

Stephane Luchini (GREQ AM):
"Truth-telling oath experiments"

November 15

Elena Cettolin (Tilburg U):
"Justice under Uncertainty"

Peter Katuscak (CERGE-Prague):
"Does Financing of Public Goods by Lotteries Crowd Out Pro-Social Incentives?"

December 10

Andreas Nicklisch (U Hamburg):
"Strategic Choice for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence"

December 13

Sebastian Fehrer (U Zürich):
"How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation (And Why That May Be A Good Thing)"

Florian Schütt (Tilburg U):
"Transparency in markets for experience goods: experimental evidence"

VCEE Away Day



On May 2 & 3, 2013, the VCEE Team travelled to Payerbach-Reichenau for two days of seminars and workshops. The agenda included the presentations of individual research projects and working papers, as well as the discussion of research results and the exchange of ideas.

Presenters:

Christopher Nell (U Vienna)

Owen Powell (U Vienna)

Fernando Quevedo (U Vienna)

Natalia Shestakova (U Vienna)

Florian Spitzer (U Vienna)

James Tremewan (U Vienna)



PUBLICATIONS AND WORKING PAPERS

Publications

“Who acts more like a Game Theorist? Group and Individual Play in a Sequential Market Game and the Effect of the Time Horizon”

W. Müller and F. Tan

Games and Economic Behavior, 82 (1), 658-674.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007>

“The Impact of Asset Repurchases and Issues in an Experimental Market”

E. Haruvy, C. Noussair and O. Powell

Review of Finance, 1-33.

<http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/04/05/rof.rft007>

“Give and Take in Dictator Games”

A. Cappelen, U. Nielsen, E. Sørensen, B. Tungodden and J.-R. Tyran

Economics Letters, 118 (2), 280-283.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030>

Working Papers

“Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion”

O. Andersson, H.J. Holm, J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström

Research Institute for Industrial Economics Discussion Papers

<http://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/1309.html>

Abstract:

We study risk taking on behalf of others, both with and without potential losses. A large-scale incentivized experiment is conducted with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population. On average, decision makers take the same risks for other people as for themselves when losses are excluded. In contrast, when losses are possible, decisions on behalf of others are more risky.

Using structural estimation, we show that this increase in risk stems from a decrease in loss aversion when others are affected by their choices.

“Risk Aversion Relates to Cognitive Ability: Fact or Fiction?”

O. Andersson, H.J. Holm, J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström

Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Paper Series

<http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0964>

Abstract:

Recent experimental studies suggest that risk aversion is negatively related to cognitive ability. In this paper we report evidence that this relation might be spurious. We recruit a large

subject pool drawn from the general Danish population for our experiment. By presenting subjects with choice tasks that vary the bias induced by random choices, we are able to generate both negative and positive correlations between risk aversion and cognitive ability. Structural estimation allowing for heterogeneity of noise yields no significant relation between risk aversion and cognitive ability. Our results suggest that cognitive ability is related to random decision making rather than to risk preferences.

“Risking Other People’s Money. Experimental Evidence on Bonus Schemes, Competition, and Altruism”

O. Andersson, H.J. Holm, J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström

Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Paper Series
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/iuiwop/0989.html>

Abstract:

We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers respond strongly to these incentives that result in an increased risk exposure of others. However, we find that the increase in risk taking is mitigated by altruistic preferences and pro-social personality traits.

“Social Centipedes: the Role of Group Identity on Preferences and Reasoning”

C. Le Coq, J. Tremewan and A. D. Wagner

Vienna Economics Papers
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/vie/viennp/1305.html>

Abstract:

Using a group identity manipulation we examine the role of social preferences in an experimental one-shot centipede game. Contrary to what social preference theory would predict, we find that players continue longer when playing with outgroup members. The explanation we provide for this result rests on two observations: (i) players should only stop if they are sufficiently confident that their partner will stop at the next node, given the exponentially-increasing payoffs in the game, and (ii) players are more likely to have this degree of certainty if they are matched with someone from the same group, whom they view as similar to themselves and thus predictable. We find strong statistical support for this argument. We conclude that group identity not only impacts a player’s utility function, as identified in earlier research, but also affects her reasoning about her partner’s behavior.

“Price Competition and Reputation in Markets for Experience Goods: An Experimental Study”

S. Huck, G. Lünser and J.-R. Tyran

WZB Berlin Discussion Papers
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wzbeoc/spii2013312.html>

Abstract:

We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers

can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and mono-poly prices). While oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endogenously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to recent models in behavioral IO that assume that consumers may with increasing complexity of the market place focus on selected dimensions of products (see, for example, Spiegler 2006).

“A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout”

M. Kartal

Social Science Research Network

<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916895>

Abstract:

I compare welfare properties of a general class of electoral systems with endogenous turnout. I find that the welfare ranking of electoral systems depends on the composition of the electorate. If citizens have identical voting costs, then all electoral systems that satisfy certain regularity properties generate the same level of welfare. If voting costs are heterogeneous, and the two parties are (almost) equally popular, then majoritarian rule generates the highest welfare among these systems. I also analyze a model with heterogeneous and group-specific costs. I show that, under certain conditions, proportional representation dominates majoritarian rule. If there is a partisan minority with sufficiently low voting costs, then, in

large elections, the minority group rules under majoritarian rule. However, proportional representation protects the majority against it, and improves welfare.

“Building Trust in Relational Contracting”

M. Kartal

Social Science Research Network

<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395956>

Abstract:

I study a relational contracting model, in which the agents discount factor is fixed and known, whereas the discount factor of the principal is her private information. This represents the situation where the agent does not fully know the motives and the preferences of the principal in the relationship. The principal discount factor can be one of two types: high or low. The high discount factor is associated with more cooperative behavior whereas a low discount factor typically results in short-sighted and opportunistic behavior. Therefore, the discount factor is a proxy for measuring trustworthiness of the principal. I focus on separating equilibria as well as pooling equilibria. I show that a separating equilibrium with signaling only in the initial period is impossible with some parameter values. Nevertheless, there always exists a separating equilibrium and it sometimes requires dynamic costly signaling for an extended period of time -i.e., costly signaling may have to continue even after types separate in the initial period. I characterize the optimal separating contract and show that the bonus payment for high performance, the agent effort and the surplus in the relationship all increase gradually in the optimal contract. Hence, the equilibrium is characterized by

gradual building of trust, which is a phenomenon that is observed in many real-world economic relationships. Finally I show that the optimal separating contract generates higher surplus than the optimal pooling contract, which is different than the outcomes in many standard signaling models.

“Laboratory Elections with Endogenous Turnout: Proportional Representation versus Majoritarian Rule”

M. Kartal

Social Science Research Network

<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396775>

Abstract:

This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the impact of proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian rule (MR) on voter participation and minority representation. Numerous empirical studies have compared electoral participation across PR and MR. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. This paper shows that the comparison of turnout across PR and MR depends on the size of the minority which the empirical papers on the topic do not control for. The paper also shows that in both data and theory PR improves minority representation at a minute cost to efficiency if the size of the minority is sufficiently large. On the other hand, the representation of a small minority does not show a remarkable improvement under PR. PR rule that I employ in the experimental design has a particularly disproportional form; in particular, it has a high entry barrier. Therefore, I conclude that the impact of the voting rule on electoral outcomes can be very sensitive to both the size of the minority and the degree of proportionality.

“Second Thoughts on Free Riding”

U. Nielsen, J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström

Discussion Papers

<http://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/1308.html>

Abstract:

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

“Discriminatory Taxes are Unpopular - Even when they are Efficient and Distributionally Fair”

R. Sausgruber and J.-R. Tyran

Social Science Research Network

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360109

Abstract:

We explore the political acceptance of taxation in commodity markets. Participants in our experiment earn incomes by trading and must collectively choose one of two tax regimes to raise a given tax revenue. A "uniform tax" (UT) imposes the same tax rate on all markets and is fair in that it yields the same – but low – income to participants in all markets. The "discriminatory tax" (DT) imposes a higher burden on markets with inelastic demand and is

therefore efficient but it is also unfair in that incomes are unequal across markets. We find that DT are unpopular, as predicted. Surprisingly, however, DT remain unpopular when they are both efficient and produce a fair (equal) distribution. We conclude that non-discrimination (equal treatment) is a salient fairness principle in

taxation that shapes voting on commodity taxes above and beyond concerns for efficiency and equal distribution.

ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

(In alphabetical order, by last name)

Melis Kartal, Assistant Professor

Presentations

- *Research seminars*: Ecole Polytechnique, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Eryk Kryowski, PhD student

Participation at conferences and workshops

- *Research seminars*: VCEE, 12 April
- *Spring School*: "Communicating Research", 13-16 May (Gols)

Wieland Müller, Director (contact person)

Presentations

- *Conferences*: Invited talk at the 1st ESSEXLab Experimental Workshop at the University of Essex, UK
- *Research seminars*: U Linz, U Konstanz, U Tilburg

Refereeing for

Econometrica, European Economic Review, Games, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology, Management Science, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Industrial Organization, Theoretical Economics

Appointments and other services to the profession

- *Affiliation* (part-time): Tilburg University, Department of Economics (Full Professor)
- *Research fellow*: VCEE (Vienna, Co-Director), CentER (Tilburg), TILEC (Tilburg), ENCORE (Amsterdam)
- *Member of selection committee*: (EARIE, Évora), Verein für Socialpolitik, 2013

- *Departmental Activities:* Member Curricularen AG – Masterstudium VWL, Chair hiring committee professorship “Industrial Organization/International Economics

Christopher Nell, PhD student

Presentations

- *Conferences:* 8th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Sept. 2013 (Stockholm); SABE/IAREP/ICABEEP 2013, July 2013 (Atlanta, USA); French Experimental Economics Association, June 2013 (Lyon)

Owen Powell, Lab Manager

Participation at conferences and workshops

- Experimental Finance (Tilburg)

Fernando Quevedo, PhD student

Participation at conferences and workshops

- *Conferences:* 4th annual meeting of the French Experimental Economics Association (ASFEE), June 20-21, 2013 (Lyon); 8th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Sep 27-28 (Stockholm)

Alexander Rabas, PhD student

Presentations

- *Conferences:* 6th Nordic Conference in Behavioral Economics, Sep 2013 (Stockholm)
- *Research seminars:* VGSE, Nov. 2013 (Vienna); VCEE, June 2013 (Vienna)

Participation at conferences and workshops

- *Workshops:* Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics, Sep 2013 (Vienna); Workshop in Behavioral Economics, Nov 2013 (Oslo)

Natalia Shestakova, Assistant Professor

Presentations

- *Research seminars:* Ural Federal University, April 19 2013; Higher School of Economics, Moscow, May 14 2013; Higher School of Economics, Saint-Petersburg, June 10 2013.

Florian Spitzer, PhD student

Presentations

- *Conferences and workshops*: World Meeting of the Economic Science Association, (Zurich); 8th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics (Stockholm); Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics (Vienna)
- *Research seminars*: VGSE (Vienna)

Refereeing for

- *Journals*: Public Choice

Contributions to policy debate and publications for the general public

- “Schaffen Institutionen Vertrauen? Einsichten aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung”, with Tyran, J.-R.; in: E. Hammer and N. Tomaschek (eds.): *Vertrauen. Standpunkte zum sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Handeln*. University – Society – Industry, Band 2, Münster: Waxmann, 2013: 91-104

Thomas Stephens, PhD student

Participation at conferences and workshops

- *Conferences and workshops*: ESA North America Conference 2013 (Santa Cruz, USA)
- *Research seminars*: VCEE Seminar (Vienna): VGSE (Vienna)

James Tremewan, Assistant Professor

Participation at conferences and workshops

- *Research seminars*: Masaryk University Economic Society Seminar, 18 March 2013; Stockholm Institute of Transition Economies Seminar, 21 May 2013; Series of lectures at International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University, Sep 2013; Series of lectures at Karaganda State Technical University, Oct 2013.

Jean-Robert Tyran, Director

Presentations

- *Conferences and workshops*: Workshop on Foundations of Social Preferences (U Zurich); “Emergence of institutions: Self-organisation for collective action”, Brisbane Club Meeting (Vienna); “Cooperation and Institutions” (WU Vienna)
- *Research seminars*: U Heidelberg, U Hamburg, U Lausanne, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin

Other activities and affiliations

- *Research grants*: Norwegian Research Council: “Experimental Markets with Search Frictions and Network Externalities” (joint with Leif Helland and Espen Moen), 2012-2015; National Research Network 103, subproject: “Experimental Investigation of Labor Markets” (joint with Rupert Sausgruber), 2011 - 2014.
- *Research fellow*: CEPR (Center for Economic Policy Research, London), EPRU (Economic Policy Research Unit, Copenhagen), The Choice Lab (NHH Bergen, Norway), CAMA (Center for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University)
- *Professional organizations*: Board of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE)
- *Associate Editor*: Judgment and Decision Making, Journal of Socio-Economics;
- *Editorial Board*: Experimental Economics, European Journal of Political Economy
- Member of *iv.future.lab* (Think tank of the Federation of Austrian Industries)
- *Member of PhD committee*: Johannes Jarke (U Heidelberg, 05.02), Diana Gaspari (U Padova, Nov. 29)
- *Academic services*: Examiner for tenure/habilitation: Charles Bellemare (U Laval), Karin Mayr (U Vienna)

Refereeing for

- *Journals*: American Economic Journal - Policy, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economics Letters, European Journal of Political Economy, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Experimental Political Science, Management Science, Review of Economic Studies
- *Institutions* (assessment of research proposals): U Bozen; Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF)

Contributions to policy debate and publications for the general public

- “Schaffen Institutionen Vertrauen? Einsichten aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung”, with Spitzer, F.; in: E. Hammer and N. Tomaschek (eds.): *Vertrauen. Standpunkte zum sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Handeln*. University – Society – Industry, Band 2, Münster: Waxmann, 2013: 91-104.
- *Wirtschaften im Labor*, uni:view, <http://medienportal.univie.ac.at/uniview/forschung/detailansicht/artikel/wirtschaften-im-labor/>