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ANNUAL REPORT 2011

A photograph of a modern glass building with a grid-like structure, reflecting the sky and surrounding environment. In the background, there are trees and a traditional building with a red roof.

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Vienna
Center for
Experimental
Economics

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2011

Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)

ANNUAL REPORT for the period of 01.01.2011 – 31.12.2011

Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)

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One of the two rooms for participants at the new laboratory facilities on the Campus. The laboratory is equipped with 28 workstations in total.

FOREWORD

The Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE) was formally established in January 2011. It is an institution of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics at the University of Vienna.

The purpose of the Center is to provide infrastructure for conducting experimental research in economics and the social sciences at the University of Vienna and is a forum for the discussion and exchange of ideas. VCEE is jointly directed by Wieland Müller and Jean-Robert Tyran, and the plan is to periodically alternate the position of managing director between the two academics.

In a first phase of the past year, the directors of VCEE devoted their efforts to “getting started”, i.e. to provide the preconditions for effective research and teaching in experimental economics at U Vienna. This task involved many dimensions as experimental economics is a new discipline at the University Vienna. Academic and support personnel had to be hired and trained, a new lab had to be built and made operational, participants for experiments were recruited, new courses prepared, a webpage was created and administrative routines established, to name some of the activities. For example, we have hired three junior professors (and are about to hire a fourth), have devised a curricular structure involving lectures and seminars, have built a 150 m² state-of-the-art experimental laboratory located on the premises of the University Campus.

These preparations enabled us in a second phase to roll out experiments, teach and train, discuss with visitors in our research seminar, and to devote (at least some of our) time to research and dissemination of results in seminars and publications. For example, various experiments with more than 400 participants have been conducted since the fall of 2011, we have started training four PhD students and taught dozens of master students in three courses, we had about 20 external visitors, VCEE faculty gave more than a dozen research presentations at conferences and seminars, disseminated research in lectures for the general public. Our research activity is documented in 11 working papers and 4 journal articles that appeared in 2011, as detailed in our report below.

This great success has only been possible with the generous financial support by the University of Vienna, effective administrative support by the faculty and the department of economics, and many hours of work by our new junior professors, administrators, IT support personnel, and of our colleagues at the department of economics. We are grateful to all for contributing to a successful start of VCEE.

Jean-Robert Tyran
Managing Director VCEE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of the Center

The Vienna Center of Experimental Economics (VCEE) provides infrastructure for conducting experimental research at the University of Vienna and is a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas.

The primary focus of the VCEE is to investigate the relevance of bounded rationality and social preferences in the economy, society and the state. In addition, the VCEE contributes to research and teaching in other branches of experimental economics and to the development of experimental methods and behavioral economic theory.

Experiments are an important tool of research in economics. Experiments can in principle be run in a laboratory, over the Internet or elsewhere “in the field”. The three types of experiments have different strengths and limitations and they often complement each other. At present, the VCEE runs experiments only in the laboratory but is aiming to expand its infrastructure in order to run experiments on the Internet and experiments “in the field” as well.

The VCEE operates a 150 m² state-of-the-art experimental laboratory located on the premises of the University Campus that includes 28 workstations and a control room. Operations began in fall 2011.

Experienced experimentalists are welcome to submit applications for

using our laboratory facilities. We try to accommodate all suitable applications. In case of capacity constraints, internal applications (by VCEE members; members of the faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics; researchers at other faculties of U Vienna) are prioritized over external ones (researchers from other institutions in Austria and abroad). Applicants are requested to consult our guidelines for users which can be downloaded from our webpage or obtained from the lab manager.

The VCEE is more than just an experimental lab. We aim at engaging in debate and intellectual exchange in all aspects of experimental economics. Since experiments can be used to investigate almost all issues in economics and the social sciences, we aim to maintain an openness concerning the substance of research. We particularly welcome interaction with researchers from other fields like political science, psychology or sociology. To this end, we run an active series of VCEE research seminars for internal and external presenters and plan to further expand our network of experienced academics as affiliates.

We also aim at developing experimental methods and tools. For example, we are investigating novel ways to run experiments with non-student subject pools, be it over the internet or in other field contexts.

Research and Publications

In 2011 research at the VCEE has resulted in a total of 11 working papers and 4 publications in highly reputed learned journals such as *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, and the *Journal of Public Economics*. Members of the VCEE have presented on-going research in public lectures, more than two dozen research seminars and various conferences.

Specific research topics studied included:

- The voluntary provision of public goods and voting in formal vs. informal sanctioning environments
- Various aspects of social preferences and rationality
- Effects of deliberation and experience on voting on taxes
- Asymmetric information, abstention and coordination in standing committees
- Bubbles and the role of numéraire
- Behaviour on markets
- Elicitation of risk preferences

Workshops, visitors and international networking

To strengthen its international research network and its international visibility, the VCEE is striving to maintain an active visitor program. In 2011, we have been able to host more than 10 short-term visitors from places such as Stanford, NYU, Columbia U, Brown U, as well as various places in Europe such as Oxford, Amsterdam or Madrid.

The VCEE has hosted a Workshop in Experimental Labour Economics in July 2011 and has started to establish a seminar series which is expected to expand in scope in 2012.

Teaching

VCEE staff has offered a lecture introducing master students to *Behavioural and Experimental Economics* (8 ECTS), and two seminars for advanced master students and PhD students to critically discuss ongoing research on *Topics in Behavioural Public Economics* (4 ECTS) and a seminar on *Topics in Behavioural and Experimental Economics* (4 ECTS). We plan to further expand the curriculum in the coming years, for example by offering a course aimed at training PhD students.



The laboratory facilities are mainly devoted to conducting research experiments, but will also serve teaching purposes. The VCEE has been supporting the integration of experimental economics into the undergraduate curriculum, and plans to further expand these activities. For example, the course *Designing and Implementing an Economic Experiment* will be offered in the summer term of 2012 and we plan to provide instructional packages for tutors and lecturers to run demonstration experiments on principles of economics.

ORGANIZATION, FACULTY AND STAFF

The VCEE thanks all collaborators for their efforts in insuring smooth operations of our laboratory facilities and for creating ideal conditions for effective research.

The VCEE is jointly directed by Wieland Müller and Jean-Robert Tyran, with the managing director alternating between the two. Both academics joined U Vienna in September 2010, with Müller previously holding a professorship in Tilburg and Tyran one in Copenhagen.

The activities in the laboratory are managed by Dr. Owen Powell who heads a team of part-time employed student assistants, administrative support came mostly from **Sandra Weissenböck** (head administrator), **Sylvie Hansbauer** (accounting), and IT support was provided by Andreas Öller.

Hiring

The VCEE and the department of economics has jointly made extensive efforts aiming at, and is proud to have succeeded in, attracting highly talented junior

faculty to Vienna. The people listed below all started working at VCEE in September 2011.

Owen Powell is our manager of the lab. He holds a PhD from Tilburg University and joined us from Carlos III of Madrid. His main research interests are Experimental Finance, Behavioral Economics, Growth and Growth Accounting.

Natalia Shestakova holds a PhD from CERGE-EI in Prague and joined us as an assistant professor. Her main research interests are in Behavioral Economics, Contract Theory and Industrial Organization.

James Tremewan holds a PhD from the Toulouse School of Economics and joined us an assistant professor. His main research interests are in Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics.

Numerous MA and PhD students have joined the VCEE in 2011. They all contributed to the effective functioning of the VCEE and to a vibrant academic atmosphere.

CURRENT PHD STUDENTS AND THEIR RESEARCH INTERESTS

- **Christopher Nell:**
public economics, tax evasion
- **Alexander Rabas:**
labor economics, gender wage gap, personality
- **Thomas Stephens:**
behavioral and experimental economics, nominal thinking, loss aversion and money illusion, voting and the welfare state
- **Elke Weidenholzer:**
behavioral and experimental economics
- **Fernando Quevedo:**
experimental economics, behaviour on markets, learning theories

Visitors in 2011

The VCEE has started to build up seminar series and aims at expanding the scope of its visitor program in the future. Our visitors serve an important function of presenting and discussing our work with internationally renowned researchers in the field. Short-term visitors usually make a seminar presentation.

Marta SERRA-GARCIA (Tilburg University), January 12th, 2011

James TREMEWAN (Toulouse School of Economics), January 14th, 2011

Fangfang TAN (Tilburg University), January 20th, 2011

Natalia SHESTAKOVA (CERGE, Prague), January 21st, 2011

Luis MILLER (CESS Nuffield College, Oxford), February 1st, 2011

Marcelo TYSZLER (University of Amsterdam), February 2nd, 2011

Owen POWELL (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) February 4th, 2011

Ernesto REUBEN (Columbia U), October 10-12, 2011

Ulrik. H. NIELSEN (Copenhagen), November 28 until December 2, 2011

Josie CHEN (Brown U), November 22 - December 2, 2011

Daniel FRIEDMAN (UCSC), April 12th-14th, 2011

Rebecca MORTON (NYU), May 23rd-30th, 2011

Muriel NIEDERLE (Stanford), June 30th, 2011

Ron HARSTAD (University of Missouri-Columbia), April 29th-May 6th, 2011

WORKSHOPS AND SEMINARS AT VCEE

Workshop on Behavioural Public Economics, 14th & 15th July 2011

The purpose of this workshop was to bring together a small group of researchers to discuss recent and prospective developments in the field of experimental labour economics. The workshop was part of the “National Research Network S103” funded by the Austrian Science Fund.

Below is a list of the presenters and other participants.

Presenters:

[Jordi Brandts](#) (U Autònoma Barcelona)
[Alexander Cappelen](#) (NHH Bergen)
[Thomas Dohmen](#) (U Maastricht)
[Uri Gneezy](#) (UC San Diego)
[Muriel Niederle](#) (Stanford U)
[Imran Rasul](#) (UCL London)
[Rupert Sausgruber](#) (U Innsbruck)
[Joel Slemrod](#) (U Michigan)
[Erik Ø. Sørensen](#) (NHH Bergen)
[Jean-Robert Tyran](#) (U Vienna)

Other participants:

[Tobias Christiani](#) (U Copenhagen)
[Martin Halla](#) (U Linz)
[Johannes Leutgeb](#) (U Vienna)
[Wieland Müller](#) (U Vienna)
[Ulrik H. Nielsen](#) (U Copenhagen)
[Alexander Rabas](#) (U Vienna)
[Thomas Stephens](#) (U Vienna)
[Doris Weichselbaumer](#) (U Linz)
[Erik Wengström](#) (U Copenhagen)
[Rudolf Winter-Ebmer](#) (U Linz)

Seminars

October 10

Ernesto Reuben (Columbia U):

“Emergence and enforcement of social norms in coordination games with heterogeneous populations”

November 18

James Tremewan (U Vienna)

“Multilateral Bargaining/ Coalition formation in continuous time”

December 16

Owen Powell (U Vienna):

“Negative bubbles and the choice of numeraire” and
“Developing Software for Experimental Economics”

PUBLICATIONS AND WORKING PAPERS

Publications

Müller, Wieland with Engelmann, Dirk (2011): "Collusion through Price Ceilings? In Search of a Focal-point Effect", *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 79(3): 291-302.

Tyran, Jean-Robert with Kamei, Kenju and Putterman, Louis, (2011): "Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes", *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(9): 1213-1222.

Tyran, Jean-Robert with Morton, Rebecca, (2011): "Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees", *Games and Economic Behavior*, 72(2): 485-509.

Tyran, Jean-Robert with Sausgruber, Rupert, (2011): "Are We Taxing Ourselves? How Deliberation and Experience Shape Voting on Taxes", *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(2): 164-176.

Working Papers

"Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes"

T. Markussen, L. Putterman and J.-R. Tyran

[Vienna Economics Papers](#)

Abstract

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal choice of a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes

possible, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Most groups adopt formal sanctions when they are of deterrent magnitude and cost a small fraction (10%) of the potential surplus. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction, however, most groups choose informal sanctions when formal sanctions are more costly (40% of the surplus). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions.

"Who Is (More) Rational?"

S. Choi, S. Kariv, W. Müller and D. Silverman

[Vienna Economics Papers](#)*Abstract:*

Revealed preference theory offers a criterion for decision-making quality: if decisions are high quality then there exists a utility function that the choices maximize. We conduct a large-scale field experiment that enables us to test subjects' choices for consistency with utility maximization and to combine the experimental data with a wide range of individual socioeconomic information for the subjects. There is considerable heterogeneity in subjects' consistency scores: high-income and high-education subjects



display greater levels of consistency than low-income and low-education subjects, men are more consistent than women, and young subjects are more consistent than older subjects. We also find that consistency with

utility maximization is strongly related to wealth: a standard deviation increase in the consistency score is associated with 15-19 percent more wealth. This result conditions on socioeconomic variables including current income, education, and family structure, and is little changed when we add controls for past income, risk tolerance and the results of a standard personality test used by psychologists.

"State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods"

K. Kamei, L. Putterman and J.-R. Tyran,

[Vienna Economics Papers](#)*Abstract:*

The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more

efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.

"Income and Ideology: How Personality Traits, Cognitive Abilities, and Education Shape Political Attitudes"

R. Morton, J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström

[Social Science Research Network](#)

Abstract:

We find that cognitive abilities, educational attainment, and some personality traits indirectly affect ideological preferences through changes in income. The effects of changes in personality traits on ideology directly and indirectly through income are in the same direction. However, the indirect effects of cognitive abilities and education often offset the direct effects of these variables on ideological preferences. That is, increases in cognitive abilities and education significantly increase income, which reduces the tendency of individuals to express leftist preferences. These indirect effects are in some cases sizeable relative to direct effects. The indirect effects of cognitive abilities through income overwhelm the direct effects such that increasing IQ increases right wing preferences. For ideological preferences over economic policy the indirect effects of advanced education also overwhelm the direct effects, such that individuals with higher education are more likely to express right wing preferences than those with lower education.

"The Gambler's Fallacy and Gender"

S. Suetens and J.R. Tyran

[Social Science Research Network](#)

Abstract:

The "gambler's fallacy" is the false belief that a random event is less likely to occur if the event has occurred recently. Such beliefs are false if the onset of events is in fact independent of previous events. We study gender differences in the gambler's fallacy using data from the Danish state lottery. Our data set is unique in that we track individual players over time which allows us to investigate how men and women react with their number picking to outcomes of recent lotto drawings. We find evidence of gambler's fallacy for men but not for women. On average, men are about 1% less likely to bet on numbers drawn in the previous week than on numbers not drawn. Women do not react significantly to the previous week's drawing outcome.

"Predicting Lotto Numbers"

C.B. Jørgensen, S. Suetens and J.-R. Tyran

[Social Science Research Network](#)

Abstract:

We investigate the "law of small numbers" using a unique panel data set on lotto gambling. Because we can track individual players over time, we can measure how they react to outcomes of recent lotto drawings. We can therefore test whether they behave as if they believe they can predict lotto numbers based on recent drawings. While most players pick the same set of numbers week after week without regards of numbers drawn or anything else, we find that those who do change act on

average in the way predicted by the law of small numbers as formalized in recent behavioral theory. In particular, on average they move away from numbers that have recently been drawn, as suggested by the “gambler’s fallacy,” and move toward numbers that are on streak, i.e. have been drawn several weeks in a row, consistent with the “hot hand fallacy”.

"Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution"

W. Höchtl, and R. Sausgruber and J.-R. Tyran

[Social Science Research Network](#)

Abstract:

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.



"Who Acts More Like a Game Theorist? Group and Individual Play in a Sequential Market Game and the Effect of the Time Horizon"

W. Müller and F. Tan

[Vienna Economics Papers](#)

Abstract:

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets we found no significant differences in the behaviour of groups and individuals, we found that the behavior of groups is further away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game than that of individuals. To a large extent, this result is independent of the method of eliciting choices (sequential or strategy method) and the method used to account for observed first- and second- mover behavior. We provide evidence on followers response functions and electronic chats to offer an explanation for the differential effect that the time horizon of interaction has on the extent of individual and group players.(non)conformity with subgame perfectness.

“Nudges and Impatience: Evidence from a Large Scale Experiment”

E. van der Heijden, T.J. Klein, W. Müller and J. Potters
[Netspar Discussion Paper](#)

Abstract:

We elicit time preferences of a representative sample of 1,102 Dutch individuals and also confront them with a series of incentivized investment decisions. There are two treatments which differ by the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment provides a nudge by stimulating decision makers to frame a sequence of risky decisions broadly rather than narrowly. We find that impatient individuals are more ‘nudgable’ than patient ones as the effect of the treatment on investment levels is significantly larger within the group of high discounters than within the group of low discounters. This result is robust to controlling for various economic and demographic variables and cognitive ability. This finding is interesting from a policy perspective because impatient individuals are often the target group of nudges as impatience is associated with problematic behaviors such as low savings, little equity holdings, low investments in human capital, and an unhealthy lifestyle.

“Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting”

J. Boone, W. Müller and S. Suetens.
[Vienna Economics Papers](#)

Abstract:

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and

Whinston (2000b), we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it leads to lower exclusion costs for the incumbent, than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes exclusive contracts to buyers sequentially, is better able to deter entry than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent.

“Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence”

J. Hinlopen, W. Müller and H.-T. Normann.
[Vienna Economics Papers](#)

Abstract:

We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. A firm has monopoly power in one market but faces competition by a second firm in another market. We compare treatments where the monopolist can bundle its two products to treatments where it cannot, and we contrast simultaneous and sequential order of moves. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling, even though substantial payoff differences between players exist. With bundling and simultaneous moves, the monopolist offers the predicted number of units. When the monopolist is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling although in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum: bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another.

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

(in alphabetic order, by last name)

Wieland Müller, Director

Presentations

Talk at VGSE, March 2011: “Naked exclusion in the lab: The case of sequential contracting”

Refereeing for (among others)

B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation

Appointments and other services to the profession

Affiliation at: Tilburg University, CentER, TILEC, ENCORE

Other activities

- Member of the PhD thesis committee Kenan Kalayci, Tilburg University
- External committee member for a Habilitation at the University of Innsbruck
- External member of the senior recruitment committee at Royal Holloway, University of London

Christopher Nell, PhD student

Presentations

Graduate and Staff Seminar at the University of Vienna: “Tax evasion related to charitable giving”

Owen Powell, Lab Manager

Presentations

“*Negative bubbles and the choice of numeraire*” at Canadian Economics Association, University of Vienna, Florence Experimental Workshop

Refereeing for

Journal of Public Economic Theory, International Game Theory Review

Alexander Rabas, PhD student

Presentations

Workshops, Seminars and Conferences: U Brixen (Italy), U Copenhagen (Denemark), U Vienna (Austria), U Lund (Sweden)

Natalia Shestakova, Assistant Professor

Participation at conferences and workshops

- “Price Discrimination with Boundedly Rational Consumers: When do Dominated Options Pay Off?” at CERGE-EI, Prague (Czech Republic)
- “Understanding Consumers’ Choice of Pricing Schemes” at EARIE, Stockholm (Sweden)
- “Industrial Organization: Theory, Empirics and Experiments”, Otranto (Italy)

Presentations

Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, Germany), U Vienna (Austria)

Thomas Stephens, PhD student

Presentations

Workshop and Conferences: 6th CEE Day, Copenhagen (Denmark); 6th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Lund (Sweden); Confronting theory with data and vice versa, Bergen (Norway)

James Tremewan, Assistant Professor

Presentations

“Multilateral Bargaining/ Coalition Formation in continuous time”, University of Vienna

Jean-Robert Tyran, Director (managing)

Presentations and dissemination of research results

- *Keynote lecture*: LeeX International Conference on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Spain).
- *Public lecture*: “Bubbles in Financial Markets. The perspective of an experimental economist”, University of Vienna
- *Conferences*: Arne Ryde Symposium (Lund, Sweden)
- *Research seminars*: Max Planck Institute (Bonn), Evang. Akademie (Tutzing), NOVA (Helsinki), U Konstanz, GSBC Jena, U Zurich.
- *Press conference*: “New experimental methods to uncover ethnic discrimination”, Rockwool Foundation, Copenhagen
- *Debate*: “Predicting the Unpredictable”, with Suetens, S. and Jorgensen, C.B., Vox, April 22, 2011

Other activities and affiliations

- Research grant: National Research Network (NFN) S103: “Labor Economics and the Welfare State”(joint with Rupert Sausgruber, 2011-14).
- Research fellow at CEPR (London), EPRU (Copenhagen), CAMA (ANU, Australia)
- Professional organizations: Executive committee ESA (Economic Science Association), Member of the Board SABE (Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics)
- Member of the Program Committee for the Annual Meetings of Verein für Socialpolitik (Frankfurt)
- Associate editor: *Judgment and Decision Making*
- Editorial Boards: *European Journal of Political Economy*, *Experimental Economics*
- Member of the evaluation group on behalf of the German Wissenschaftsrat for assessing the Institutional Strategy of LMU Munich
- External member of PhD committee of Stefania Sitzia (U East Anglia)
- Refereeing: for about a dozen journals per year

Elke Weidenholzer, PhD student

Presentations

The Graduate and Staff Seminar, University of Vienna